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Starting a business isn’t an easy task, no matter how small it is. Unlike employees, entrepreneurs are faced with uncertainty ahead of them. In fact, found that 20% of small businesses fail in the first year, 30% in the second year, 50% after the fifth year, and 70% fail in their tenth year. However, it turns out that big companies aren’t immune to failures as well. a study History has taught us over and over again that in business, no company is ever too big to fall. From Yahoo, Blackberry, and Nokia, we’ve all heard about the tales of how those once-dominant companies fall from grace. But luckily for them, they still survive even though not exactly as big and as profitable as they were before. In this article, we’ll take a look at 5 big brands that weren’t as lucky and actually had to file for bankruptcy. The reason for their demise varies between one another, and we sincerely hope that you can take valuable lessons from [link to infographic] and apply it to your business to make it even better. the death of these brands Blockbuster Blockbuster was the main player in the DVD and video game renting industry. Founded in 1985, the company once had 9,000 stores across the U.S and $6 Billion yearly revenue at the height of its success. In 2000, a small startup called Netflix offered a partnership where Netflix would take care of Blockbuster’s online business. Being a big brand and an industry’s market leader that it was, Blockbuster turned down the offer. What happened next is history. Ten years after turning down Netflix, Blockbuster went bankrupt and Netflix now worth billions of dollars. The reason for its downfall Blockbuster was doing really good and being too comfortable at its own success, they failed to see the future. Instead of expanding its business to digital, they just kept wasting money on their offline stores. On the other hand, Netflix saw a weakness in Blockbuster’s business model, which was the fees for late return, and created the monthly subscription model where customers only need to pay once a month to watch an unlimited amount of movies. This and the fact that people don’t need to leave their house to rent a DVD anymore helped Netflix in running Blockbuster out of business. The lesson of the story When you’re on top, don’t be arrogant and think that you’re invincible because it will cloud your judgment to see other opportunities or threats. Keep learning and keep finding ways to grow your business. Sears This is another case of an extremely old company that failed to adapt to changes. Sears was the Amazon of the 1890s when they first created its product catalog, where people can order things and have the goods shipped to their home. This was the innovation that no other company did at that time, and helped Sears rose to prominence while eliminating other smaller general stores. They opened their first department store in 1925, selling almost everything from home appliances, electronics, to men and women’s fashion products. In the next few decades, Sears asserted its position as the leading company in the retail and department store industry. Then in the 80s and 90s, Walmart came along and took over as the leading retail store company in the U.S. Things were starting to go downhill for Sears, and the new online business model by Amazon in the 2000s put the final nail in the coffin. Sears filed for bankruptcy in October 2018. The reason for its downfall So, what went wrong? How can a 132-year old company fail? The simplest way of putting it is because Sears stopped innovating and became stagnant. The problem with most big old companies is that the business model is rooted too deep and for too long, making it hard for them to change their ways of doing things. Take a look at its mortar and brick competitor, Walmart. When the online department store model by Amazon became a hit, Walmart reacted well and added an online service to its already well-developed offline business. When Sears realized its mistakes, it was too late. Several attempts were done to revive the struggling company, one of them was to and let them compete with each other. It turned out to be a fatal mistake, as this bold change only worsened their financial management and increased unnecessary costs, leading to its eventual demise. divide the company into 30 divisions The lesson of the story Don’t ever stop creating new innovations and different ways of doing things. Sears was and Amazon is a pioneer in the retail industry, and that’s what made them stand out from their competitors. Netscape Before Google Chrome and Safari even existed, there was Mosaic. This browser, who later changed its name to Netscape, was among the first web browser during the early days of the internet. By early 1995, Netscape was the leading gate to the internet with no apparent competitor. However, unknown to the public and Netscape itself, Microsoft was secretly working on its own web browser to compete with Netscape. In August 1995, Microsoft released Internet Explorer 1.0 and the rest is a history of the browser war between Netscape and Internet Explorer. While Netscape was a paid service, Internet Explorer offered a free service to the public. This caused a massive drop in revenue and market share for Netscape. While struggling to keep itself stay afloat, the browser was eventually purchased by AOL for a whopping $4.2 billion. Unfortunately, Netscape still failed to compete with Internet Explorer and the division was eventually shut down by AOL in 2003. As a consolation, however, Netscape open-sourced its web browser and eventually gave birth to Mozilla Firefox. The reason for its downfall There are several factors that led to the demise of Netscape. The first one is the fact that Microsoft could offer a free web browser. Netscape charged its users because it was the only source of income for them, while Microsoft can offer Internet Explorer for free because they mainly sold operating systems (Windows). The second factor is because Netscape lost its focus. When Internet Explorer was catching up, Netscape panicked and tried to stuff down as many features as possible. Netscape Communicator 4.0 came with a web browser, an email reader, a web page editor, a conferencing tool, and Netcaster. On the other hand, Microsoft focused only on making Internet Explorer a web browser and nothing else. As a result, the Netscape browser became laggy and slow, further convincing its customers to move away. The lesson of the story Take it one step at a time, don’t force something when you’re not ready yet. Always give the best quality when it comes to your product and service. Also, give values that no one else can give to make the customers keep coming back to you. Takeaway Running a business isn’t easy, that’s why you need to keep learning from other companies’ successes and failures. From the death of the Blockbuster, Sears, and Netscape, we can conclude that there are 4 things you need to avoid in business: Arrogance Stagnation Bad financial management, and Loss of focus. And there are 5 essential things you have to do in your business: Keep learning Adapt to changes Keep innovating Always maintain a top quality for your product and service, and Give values that no one else offers. Doing these things won't guarantee you success, but it will surely give you the necessary guidance in growing your business.

How To Not Be Blockbuster (And Other Failures, Like Netscape And Sears)

United States Of America. v. Microsoft Corporation Court Filing by Thomas Penfield Jackson, November 5, 1999 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 52 of 58. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here In late 1995 and early 1996, Navigator seemed well on its way to becoming the standard software for browsing the Web. Within three years, however, Microsoft had successfully denied Navigator that status, and had thereby forestalled a serious potential threat to the applications barrier to entry. Indeed, Microsoft’s Kumar Mehta felt comfortable expressing to Brad Chase in February 1998 his “PERSONAL opinion” that “the browser battle is close to over.” Mehta continued: “We set out on this mission 2 years ago to not let netscape dictate standards and control the browser api’s [sic]. All evidence today says they don’t.” The population of browser users is expanding so quickly that Navigator’s installed base has grown even as its usage share has fallen. In fact, AOL credited an estimate stating that Navigator’s installed base in the United States alone grew from fifteen million in 1996 to thirtythree million in December 1998. By all indications, Navigator’s installed base will continue to grow. This does not mean, however, that Navigator is — or will be — an attractive enough platform for the development of network-centric applications to weaken the applications barrier to entry. As discussed above, the APIs that Navigator exposes could only attract enough developer attention to threaten the applications barrier to entry if Navigator became — or appeared destined to become — the standard software used to browse the Web. Navigator’s installed base may continue to grow, but Internet Explorer’s installed base is now larger and growing faster. Consequently, the APIs that Navigator exposes will not attract enough developer attention to spawn a body of cross-platform, network-centric applications large enough to dismantle the applications barrier to entry. Not only did Microsoft prevent Navigator from undermining the applications barrier to entry, it inflicted considerable harm on Netscape’s business in the process. By ensuring that the firms comprising the channels that lead most efficiently to browser usage distributed and promoted Internet Explorer to the virtual exclusion of Navigator, Microsoft relegated Netscape to more costly and less effective methods of distributing and promoting its browsing software. After Microsoft started licensing Internet Explorer at no charge, not only to OEMs and consumers, but also to IAPs, ISVs, ICPs, and even Apple, Netscape was forced to follow suit. Despite the fact that it did not charge for Internet Explorer, Microsoft could still defray the massive costs it was undertaking to maximize usage share with the vast profits earned licensing Windows. Because Netscape did not have that luxury, it could ill afford the dramatic drop in revenues from Navigator, much less to pay for the inefficient modes of distribution to which Microsoft had consigned it. The financial constraints also deterred Netscape from undertaking technical innovations that it might otherwise have implemented in Navigator. Microsoft was not altogether surprised, then, when it learned in November 1998 that Netscape had surrendered itself to acquisition by another company. Were AOL ever to attempt to revive Navigator’s usage share with the intention of building it into a significant platform for the development of network-centric applications, that effort would not make any headway before January 1, 2001, when AOL’s obligation to distribute Internet Explorer on a preferential basis expires. In fact, there is presently no indication that AOL will try even after that date to raise Navigator’s usage share substantially. First of all, as explained above, AOL need not revive Navigator’s usage share in order to achieve an adequate return on its investment in Netscape. Secondly, while the due-diligence summary and board-ofdirectors presentation that preceded the Netscape acquisition discuss AOL’s commitment to invest marketing resources in an effort to stem the slide in Navigator’s share, neither report indicates any intention on AOL’s part to invest in actually raising Navigator’s share. Also detracting from the notion that AOL is committed to reviving the middleware threat through Navigator is the fact that AOL included in the November 1998 agreement with Sun a provision making clear that the new partnership with Sun in no way obligated AOL to drop Internet Explorer from its client software in favor of Navigator. The provision states that “AOL has no present intention to make any such replacement or use and shall have no obligation to make any such replacement or use, and that it is AOL’s present expectation that it . . . may seek to renew and/or extend and expand its present agreement with Microsoft Corporation to continue to distribute Internet Explorer.” Bill Gates himself, who is not one to underestimate threats to Microsoft’s business, apparently concluded after reviewing the November 1998 transactions that AOL would not seek to develop a platform that would compete with Microsoft’s network-centric interfaces. In December 1998, during a meeting convened to analyze the implications of the AOL/Netscape/Sun transactions, Gates declared to the assembled Microsoft executives, “AOL doesn’t have it in their genes to attack us in the platform space.” Finally, if its coveted placement in the Online Services Folder fails to entice AOL into extending its agreement with Microsoft past January 2001, Microsoft assuredly has the wherewithal to offer AOL additional inducements in exchange for yet more commitments that will preclude a resurgence of Navigator’s usage share. Even if, despite the absence of signs to that effect, AOL drops Internet Explorer and adopts Navigator with a mind to reviving Navigator’s usage share after January 1, 2001, Navigator’s transformation into a platform attractive enough to threaten the applications barrier would be a chimerical aspiration, especially considering Microsoft’s increasing influence over network-centric standards. In any event, nothing that happens after January 1, 2001 will change the fact that Microsoft has succeeded in forestalling for several years Navigator’s evolution in that direction. Although the suspicion lingers, the evidence is insufficient to find that Microsoft’s ambition is a future in which most or all of the content available on the Web would be accessible only through its own browsing software. The evidence does, however, reveal an intent to ensure that if and when full-featured, server-based applications begin appearing in large numbers on the Web, the number of them relying solely on middleware APIs (such as those exposed by Navigator) will be too few to attenuate the applications barrier to entry. At least partly because of Navigator’s substantial usage share, most developers continue to insist that their Web content be more-or-less as attractive when accessed with Navigator as it is when accessed with Internet Explorer. Navigator will retain an appreciable usage share through the end of 2000. After that point, AOL may be able and willing to prevent Internet Explorer’s share from achieving such dominance that a critical mass of developers will cease to concern themselves with ensuring that their Web content at least be accessible through non-Microsoft browsing software. So, as matters stand at present, while Microsoft has succeeded in forestalling the development of enough full-featured, cross-platform, networkcentric applications to render the applications barrier penetrable, it is not likely to drive non- Microsoft PC Web browsing software from the marketplace altogether. Continue reading . here About We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: This court case Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) retrieved on 2-13-2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

Microsoft Declared That The Browser Battle Was Close to Over: And They Were Absolutely Right

United States Of America. v. Microsoft Corporation Court Filing by Thomas Penfield Jackson, November 5, 1999 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 41 of 58. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here d. Effect of Microsoft’s Actions in the OEM Channel Microsoft has largely succeeded in exiling Navigator from the crucial OEM distribution channel. Even though a few OEMs continue to offer Navigator on some of their PCs, Microsoft has caused the number of OEMs offering Navigator, and the number of PCs on which they offer it, to decline dramatically. Before 1996, Navigator enjoyed a substantial and growing presence on the desktop of new PCs. Over the next two years, however, Microsoft’s actions forced the number of copies of Navigator distributed through the OEM channel down to an exiguous fraction of what it had been. By January 1998, Kempin could report to his superiors at Microsoft that, of the sixty OEM sub-channels (15 major OEMs each offering corporate desktop, consumer/small business, notebook, and workstation PCs), Navigator was being shipped through only four. Furthermore, most of the PCs shipped with Navigator featured the product in a manner much less likely to lead to usage than if its icon appeared on the desktop. For example, Sony only featured Navigator in a folder rather than on the desktop, and Gateway only shipped Navigator on a separate CD-ROM rather than pre-installed on the hard drive. By the beginning of January 1999, Navigator was present on the desktop of only a tiny percentage of the PCs that OEMs were shipping. To the extent Netscape is still able to distribute Navigator through the OEM channel, Microsoft has substantially increased the cost of that distribution. Although in January 1999 (in the midst of this trial), Compaq suddenly decided to resume the pre-installation of Navigator on its Presario PCs, Compaq’s reversal came only after Netscape agreed to provide Compaq with approximately $700,000 worth of free advertising. In sum, Microsoft successfully secured for Internet Explorer — and foreclosed to Navigator — one of the two distribution channels that leads most efficiently to the usage of browsing software. Even to the extent that Navigator retains some access to the OEM channel, Microsoft has relegated it to markedly less efficient forms of distribution than the form vouchsafed for Internet Explorer, namely, prominent placement on the Windows desktop. Microsoft achieved this feat by using a complementary set of tactics. First, it forced OEMs to take Internet Explorer with Windows and forbade them to remove or obscure it — restrictions which both ensured the prominent presence of Internet Explorer on users’ PC systems and increased the costs attendant to pre-installing and promoting Navigator. Second, Microsoft imposed additional technical restrictions to increase the cost of promoting Navigator even more. Third, Microsoft offered OEMs valuable consideration in exchange for commitments to promote Internet Explorer exclusively. Finally, Microsoft threatened to penalize individual OEMs that insisted on pre-installing and promoting Navigator. Although Microsoft’s campaign to capture the OEM channel succeeded, it required a massive and multifarious investment by Microsoft; it also stifled innovation by OEMs that might have made Windows PC systems easier to use and more attractive to consumers. That Microsoft was willing to pay this price demonstrates that its decision-makers believed that maximizing Internet Explorer’s usage share at Navigator’s expense was worth almost any cost. Continue reading . here About We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: This court case Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) retrieved on 2-09-2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

The Effect of Microsoft's Action in the OEM Channel

United States Of America. v. Microsoft Corporation Court Filing by Thomas Penfield Jackson, November 5, 1999 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 35 of 58. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here F. Excluding Navigator from Important Distribution Channels Decision-makers at Microsoft worried that simply developing its own attractive browser product, pricing it at zero, and promoting it vigorously would not divert enough browser usage from Navigator to neutralize it as a platform. They believed that a comparable browser product offered at no charge would still not be compelling enough to consumers to detract substantially from Navigator’s existing share of browser usage. This belief was due, at least in part, to the fact that Navigator already enjoyed a very large installed base and had become nearly synonymous with the Web in the public’s consciousness. If Microsoft was going to raise Internet Explorer’s share of browser usage and lower Navigator’s share, executives at Microsoft believed they needed to constrict Netscape’s access to the distribution channels that led most efficiently to browser usage. The Importance of the OEM and IAP Channels Very soon after it recognized the need to gain browser usage share at Navigator’s expense, Microsoft identified pre-installation by OEMs and bundling with the proprietary client software of IAPs as the two distribution channels that lead most efficiently to browser usage. Two main reasons explain why these channels are so efficient. First, users must acquire a computer and connect to the Internet before they can browse the Web. Thus, the OEM and IAP channels lead directly to virtually every user of browsing software. Second, both OEMs and IAPs are able to place browsing software at the immediate disposal of a user without any effort on the part of the user. If an OEM pre-installs a browser onto its PCs and places an icon for that browser on the default screen, or “desktop,” of the operating system, purchasers of those PCs will be confronted with the icon as soon as the operating system finishes loading into random access memory (“RAM”). If an IAP bundles a browser with its own proprietary software, its subscribers will, by default, use the browser whenever they connect to the Web. In its internal decision-making, Microsoft has placed considerable reliance on studies showing that consumers tend strongly to use whatever browsing software is placed most readily at their disposal, and that once they have acquired, found, and used one browser product, most are reluctant — and indeed have little reason — to expend the effort to switch to another. Microsoft has also relied on studies showing that a very large majority of those who browse the Web obtain their browsing software with either their PCs or their IAP subscriptions. Indeed, no other distribution channel for browsing software even approaches the efficiency of OEM pre-installation and IAP bundling. The primary reason is that the other channels require users to expend effort before they can start browsing. The traditional retail channel, for example, requires the consumer to make contact with a retailer, and retailers generally do not distribute products without charging a price for them. Naturally, once Microsoft and Netscape began offering browsing software for free, consumers for the most part lost all incentive to pay for it. The relatively few users who already have a browser but would prefer another can avoid the retail channel by using the Internet to download new browsing software electronically, but they must wait for the software to transmit to their PCs. ' This process takes a moderate degree of sophistication and substantial amount of time, and as the average bandwidth of PC connections has grown, so has the average size of browser products. The longer it takes for the software to download, the more likely it is that the user’s connection to the Internet will be interrupted. As a vanguard of the “Internet Age,” Navigator generated a tremendous amount of excitement in its early days among technical sophisticates, who were willing to devote time and effort to downloading the software. Today, however, the average Web user is more of a neophyte, and is far more likely to be intimidated by the process of downloading. It is not surprising, then, that downloaded browsers now make up only a small and decreasing percentage of the new browsers (as opposed to upgrades) that consumers obtain and use. The consumer who receives a CD-ROM containing a free browser in the mail or as a magazine insert is at least spared the time and effort it would take to obtain browsing software from a retail vendor or to download it from the Web. But, just as the consumer who obtains a browser at retail or off the Web, the consumer who receives the software unsolicited at home must first install it on a PC system in order to use it, and merely installing a browser product takes time and can be confusing for novice users. Plus, a large percentage of the unsolicited disks distributed through “carpet bombing” reach individuals who do not have PCs, who already have pre-installed browsing software, or who have no interest in browsing the Web. In practice, less than two percent of CD-ROM disks disseminated in mass-distribution campaigns are used in the way the distributor intended. As a result, this form of distribution is rarely profitable, and then only when undertaken by on-line subscription services for whom a sale translates into a stream of revenues lasting into the future. The fact that an OLS may find it worthwhile to “carpet bomb” consumers with free disks obviously only helps the vendor of browsing software whose product the OLS has chosen to bundle with its proprietary software. So, while there are other means of distributing browsers, the fact remains that to a firm interested in browser usage, there simply are no channels that compare in efficiency to OEM preinstallation and IAP bundling. Knowing that OEMs and IAPs represented the most efficient distribution channels of browsing software, Microsoft sought to ensure that, to as great an extent as possible, OEMs and IAPs bundled and promoted Internet Explorer to the exclusion of Navigator. 2. Excluding Navigator from the OEM Channel a. Binding Internet Explorer to Windows i. The Status of Web Browsers as Separate Products Consumers determine their software requirements by identifying the functionalities they desire. While consumers routinely evaluate software products on the basis of the functionalities the products deliver, they generally lack sufficient information to make judgements based on the designs and implementations of those products. Accordingly, consumers generally choose which software products to license, install, and use on the basis of the products’ functionalities, not their designs and implementations. While the meaning of the term “Web browser” is not precise in all respects, there is a consensus in the software industry as to the functionalities that a Web browser offers a user. Specifically, a Web browser provides the ability for the end user to select, retrieve, and perceive resources on the Web. There is also a consensus in the software industry that these functionalities are distinct from the set of functionalities provided by an operating system. Many consumers desire to separate their choice of a Web browser from their choice of an operating system. Some consumers, particularly corporate consumers, demand browsers and operating systems separately because they prefer to standardize on the same browser across different operating systems. For such consumers, standardizing on the browser of their choice results in increased productivity and lower training and support costs, and permits the establishment of consistent security and privacy policies governing Web access. Moreover, many consumers who need an operating system, including a substantial percentage of corporate consumers, do not want a browser at all. For example, if a consumer has no desire to browse the Web, he may not want a browser taking up memory on his hard disk and slowing his system’s performance. Also, for businesses desiring to inhibit employees’ access to the Internet while minimizing system support costs, the most efficient solution is often using PC systems without browsers. Because of the separate demand for browsers and operating systems, firms have found it efficient to supply the products separately. A number of operating system vendors offer consumers the choice of licensing their operating systems without a browser. Others bundle a browser with their operating system products but allow OEMs, value-added resellers, and consumers either to not install it or, if the browser has been pre-installed, to uninstall it. While Microsoft no longer affords this flexibility (it is the only operating system vendor that does not), it has always marketed and distributed Internet Explorer separately from Windows in several channels. These include retail sales, service kits for ISVs, free downloads over the Internet, and bundling with other products produced both by Microsoft and by third-party ISVs. In order to compete with Navigator for browser share, as well as to satisfy corporate consumers who want their diverse PC platforms to present a common browser interface to employees, Microsoft has also created stand-alone versions of Internet Explorer that run on operating systems other than 32-bit Windows, including the Mac OS and Windows 3.x. In conclusion, the preferences of consumers and the responsive behavior of software firms demonstrate that Web browsers and operating systems are separate products. Continue reading . here About We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: This court case Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) retrieved on 2-07-2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

Microsoft Excluded Navigator From Important Distribution Channels

United States Of America. v. Microsoft Corporation Court Filing by Thomas Penfield Jackson, November 5, 1999, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 33 of 58. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here D. Developing Competitive Web Browsing Software Once it became clear to senior executives at Microsoft that Netscape would not abandon its efforts to develop Navigator into a platform, Microsoft focused its efforts on ensuring that few developers would write their applications to rely on the APIs that Navigator exposed. Developers would only write to the APIs exposed by Navigator in numbers large enough to threaten the applications barrier if they believed that Navigator would emerge as the standard software employed to browse the Web. If Microsoft could demonstrate that Navigator would not become the standard, because Microsoft’s own browser would attract just as much if not more usage, then developers would continue to focus their efforts on a platform that enjoyed enduring ubiquity: the 32-bit Windows API set. Microsoft thus set out to maximize Internet Explorer’s share of browser usage at Navigator’s expense. Microsoft’s management believed that, no matter what the firm did, Internet Explorer would not capture a large share of browser usage as long as it remained markedly inferior to Navigator in the estimation of consumers. The task of technical personnel at Microsoft, then, was to make Internet Explorer’s features at least as attractive to consumers as Navigator’s. Microsoft did not believe that improved quality alone would depose Navigator, for millions of users appeared to be satisfied with Netscape’s product, and Netscape was known as ‘the Internet company.’ As Gates wrote to Microsoft’s executive staff in his May 1995 “Internet Tidal Wave” memorandum, “First we need to offer a decent client,” but “this alone won’t get people to switch away from Netscape.” Still, once Microsoft ensured that the average consumer would be just as comfortable browsing with Internet Explorer as with Navigator, Microsoft could employ other devices to induce consumers to use its browser instead of Netscape’s. From 1995 onward, Microsoft spent more than $100 million each year developing Internet Explorer. The firm’s management gradually increased the number of developers working on Internet Explorer from five or six in early 1995 to more than one thousand in 1999. Although the first version of Internet Explorer was demonstrably inferior to Netscape’s thencurrent browser product when the former was released in July 1995, Microsoft’s investment eventually started to pay technological dividends. When Microsoft released Internet Explorer 3.0 in late 1996, reviewers praised its vastly improved quality, and some even rated it as favorably as they did Navigator. After the arrival of Internet Explorer 4.0 in late 1997, the number of reviewers who regarded it as the superior product was roughly equal to those who preferred Navigator. Continue reading . here About We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: This court case Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) retrieved on 2-07-2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

Microsoft Was Developing Competitive Web Browsing Software

United States Of America. v. Microsoft Corporation Court Filing by Thomas Penfield Jackson, November 5, 1999, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 28 of 58. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here B. Withholding Crucial Technical Information Microsoft knew that Netscape needed certain critical technical information and assistance in order to complete its Windows 95 version of Navigator in time for the retail release of Windows 95. Indeed, Netscape executives had made a point of requesting this information, especially the so-called Remote Network Access (“RNA”) API, at the June 21 meeting. As was discussed above, the Microsoft representatives at the meeting had responded that the haste with which Netscape received the desired technical information would depend on whether Netscape entered the so-called “special relationship” with Microsoft. Specifically, Microsoft representative J. Allard had told Barksdale that the way in which the two companies concluded the meeting would determine whether Netscape received the RNA API immediately or in three months. Although Netscape declined the special relationship with Microsoft, its executives continued, over the weeks following the June 21 meeting, to plead for the RNA API. Despite Netscape’s persistence, Microsoft did not release the API to Netscape until late October, i.e., as Allard had warned, more than three months later. The delay in turn forced Netscape to postpone the release of its Windows 95 browser until substantially after the release of Windows 95 (and Internet Explorer) in August 1995. As a result, Netscape was excluded from most of the holiday selling season. Microsoft similarly withheld a scripting tool that Netscape needed to make its browser compatible with certain dial-up ISPs. Microsoft had licensed the tool freely to ISPs that wanted it, and in fact had cooperated with Netscape in drafting a license agreement that, by mid July 1996, needed only to be signed by an authorized Microsoft executive to go into effect. There the process halted, however. In mid-August, a Microsoft representative informed Netscape that senior executives at Microsoft had decided to link the grant of the license to the resolution of all open issues between the companies. Netscape never received a license to the scripting tool, and as a result, was unable to do business with certain ISPs for a time. Continue reading . here About We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: This court case Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) retrieved on 2-06-2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

Microsoft Withheld Crucial Information

Web developers are the builders of web pages like this one. Consider how we are collaborating here: You, on the reading side, and me, becoming a better writer with the support of an editor from HackerNoon. Do you see the developers? Probably not, as they did a good job. We are likely to find them reading about the . future of web development What I offer with this article, on the other hand, is an opportunity to pause and reflect on the emergence of web developers, how that ties to the history of browsers, and how their collaboration has reignited the timeline of browser development. A new kind of engineer, for the web + In the early days of the web, many software engineers did not pay much attention to web development in terms of web pages. Why would they, right? If you were an engineer, would you be impressed by the first passenger coming from the locomotive or the locomotive itself? , from the , wrote it well: Jason Kottke Home of Fine HyperText Products Using to surf the World Wide Web for the very first time in the basement physics lab at college was as close to a religious experience as I’ve ever had. It was a thunderbolt that completely changed my life. NCSA Mosaic But that first impression also allowed hackers (and painters) to approach the subject from the user interface aspect of it. Therefore, the invention and innovation of the Mosaic browser mark the beginning of the opportunities with web development: Early in 1993, the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois released a first version of its Mosaic browser. This software ran in the X Window System environment, popular in the research community, and offered friendly window-based interaction. Shortly afterwards the NCSA released versions also for the PC and Macintosh environments. The existence of reliable user-friendly browsers on these popular computers had an immediate impact on the spread of the WWW. Notice how the browser, as a tool, started to make a lot of sense as the infrastructure behind showed the potential: On 30 April 1993, CERN made the source code of WorldWideWeb available on a royalty-free basis, making it free software. By late 1993 there were over 500 known web servers, and the WWW accounted for 1% of internet traffic, which seemed a lot in those days (the rest was remote access, e-mail and file transfer). It was a surreal experience because of that friendly interface that showed the potential to access knowledge from everywhere. Perhaps not different from how I felt when using ChatGPT as a friendly interface that showed the potential to access knowledge from everywhere. Consider reading about the history of Mosaic, and the invention of the Web, in the following article: https://hackernoon.com/how-the-browser-wars-changed-the-landscape-of-the-internet?embedable=true View-source: Learn via examples copying But web pages were quite simple. At the time, we - computer science students - would find smart people by how their pages were simple, like this one from . Dennis Ritchie at Bell Labs As I was there as a curious user - not attending the computer science lectures and playing with the web - I also stumbled into a menu option, , that enabled us to view the source of web pages. And by the way, almost overnight that Mosaic browser was called Netscape. incorporated into the browser Jim Nielsen has reflected in and identified how the Netscape browser had enabled a learning opportunity - instantaneously - for every page on the web. The Spirit of View-Source In his article, he quoted an observation from Clive Thompson in the book Coders Every single web page you visited contained the code showing you how it was created. The entire internet became a library of how-to guides on programming. Now, try to picture “the web” as the hottest thing around and imagine how many of us were checking the source of pages to copy ideas from others and try to learn eventually. These were the “view-source days” where we could see the magic. Although we still have the “view page source” in the menu of modern browsers, if you view the source of a web page, you will likely see something that looks mysterious: JavaScript: Control and interaction Another inflection point, well perceived, came about when Netscape (again) enabled JavaScript - the programming language - that allowed web developers to create scripts to control certain aspects of web pages and to have control over the interaction. h, the inventor of and the now-CEO of , has given us a that summarizes the hero’s journey of JavaScript in the land of the Web. His points helps us see that JavaScript was not always seen as elegant but was being heavily used in the end of the day - and continued to improve. Brendan Eic JavaScript Brave Software The Browser That Cares about your Privacy slide The following screenshot shows an alert box invoked from the Netscape 2 browser interface. Web developers used JavaScript to launch visual alerts (to debug their code) and do impossible things such as control web forms, validate the value of an input form, and other use cases. Needless to say that a curious user could learn about JavaScript on a page through the “view source.” The HTML page was the envelope that conveyed a great deal of presentation and logical structure about sites through its HTML elements, hyperlinks, images, style, and JavaScript code. Dynamic HTML: Layout customizations and animation And another opportunity was enabled through a new tag in HTML named < >. Back in the day, around 1997, Netscape launched Netscape Communicator Preview Release with new APIs for developers. According to a press release, “ ” layer Dynamic HTML is a significant milestone for HTML, providing designers more flexibility and control over Web page layout, while providing users a greater degree of interactivity. Later the <layer /> tag became the <div />. The technical innovation at the time had to do with the ability to position a visual piece of HTML, an element, on top of another, as the following 3D illustration shows . from one of the earliest DHTML technotes For now, you won’t be able to experience the following demonstration from 1997 but try to imagine that train (which was just an image) moving as if it was coming toward you. The trick consisted of using JavaScript to toggle the visibility of images of different sizes creating an illusion of an animation. The page also launched the sound of a locomotive using some other methods. At that point, the browser wars at its peak, developers who had started writing pages for Netscape, like me, started to produce pages for Internet Explorer, unlike me. These differences - and the skills required - contributed as reasons for developers to be hired as web developers. The magnitude and complexity of the DHTML movement correlates with the content written by this . popular book of 1000+ pages Web Standards A major outcome of the browser wars is that Netscape released its source code as open-source. This is where the name Mozilla appears, as documented in Project . That process was strategic, complex, and risky. It was a bold move as acknowledged by the then-CEO Jim Barksdale: Code Rush “Well, it’s certainly my hope that the enormous amount of new people that no one company could afford to have working on any product - now contributing to the Netscape Navigator Communicator - will make a significant difference in the improvement of the product. How that works against any competitor, remains to be seen.” Jim Barksdale @ Code Rush 2013 29min55sec Aside from the open-source foundation, a key strategy from Mozilla sparked attention of web developers - its Web standards support. To help with that, Netscape has assembled a new team of technology evangelists. Among them, the CSS guru that attained celebrity status among developers. Their cause resonated with needs of web developers - to end the proprietary differences and have a common ground to implement pages working with all browsers. Eric has celebrated our fight: Eric Meyer “ “So here’s to Bob Clary, Marcio Galli, Katsuhiko Momoi, Chris Nalls, Tristan Nitot, Arun Ranganathan, Doron Rosenberg, and Susie Wyshak.  We fought the good fight and created a lot of great material, including information about the redesign of DevEdge itself. Keep in mind that the above is a small piece of a larger photo. Another part of it was the documentation efforts by Mozilla, which has grown later as Mozilla Developer Network. Single-Page Applications and the AJAX way As developers were helping themselves to fix web pages in standards-compliant ways, they were also pushing pages to the limits. These were the days when use cases like , and initiatives like , have enabled us to consider the idea of - what if a web page could work like software applications? The following articles show what the evangelists were writing at the time: Gmail came along Web Services single-page applications (06 Jun 2003) Accessing Web Services In Netscape 7.1/Mozilla 1.4 Using WSDL Proxying (20 May 2003) Standards-Based Collapsible Table of Contents Widget (CTOCWidget) (16 May 2003) Inner-Browsing: Extending Web Browsing the Navigation Paradigm Despite these efforts, an inflection point came also from the old west. In 2005, Jesse James Garrett from San Francisco, wrote a seminal article entitled " " Jesse was an user experience designer that impacted web development worldwide. AJAX became a popular term used by developers to convey the intention to add interactivity and create the behavior of web applications. Ajax: A New Approach to Web Applications, If you were to hire someone to create a single-page application, you had to hire a web developer that knew AJAX: The Developer’s Best Friend  - Developer Add-on Tools and Page Inspection The Mozilla project continued the saga, now with Firefox. Firefox carried on the goods of Mozilla and has reached a readiness level in terms of performance, security, and standards support. But the turning point was that it gained the trust of developers not justified by market share but because of built-in tools that helped them to test and troubleshoot pages. extension - written by that had worked at Netscape - came along in 2006 and helped to build the moment when browser add-ons were increasingly being used to help web developers to debug pages. The usage of Firebug also correlates with rise of the famous written by John Resig which was Firebug Joe Hewitt jQuery library hired by Mozilla in 2007. Product managers were not unaware that developers were using Firefox to test their pages and deliver faster, even if the main browser, in terms of markeshare, was Internet Explorer. Firefox as a tool to help build pages - used by web developers - was a worldwide phenomenon, better understood if you look at a 2008 presentation from Mozilla contributors Clauber and Mario entitled Firefox - Developer's Best Friend. On a key slide they stated the importance of using Firefox as a development framework due to its Web standard support and development add-ons for debugging of JavaScript and more. The rest is history - JS libraries, and frameworks Now, am I crazy to talk about what is next? No way. If you are web developer, you might be feeling the heat and the complexity of what you know that has happened. Let’s end this party here with: Browsers have evolved, pages evolved, developers too. And to say that all the players are equally contributing in a fast pace - too fast - to the point that I prefer to look at the past and celebrate. A few notes are important. One is that I didn’t mention the aspects in terms of server side. It would be difficult to incorporate that reflection with structure, although I acknowlede that web developers branched as front-end, back-end, or fullstack. Another is that the moment indicated as “Firefox as the Developer’s Best Friend” came in sync with the rise of libraries shipped alongside web pages. A good example is the library . Therefore, the "jQuery + Firefox as Developer’s Best Friends" days was really a phenomenon where the code of pages started to get complex and demanded more engineering role involved - more bugs in the client side of pages. jQuery That observation would open the door to consider the emergence of libraries like React and, among other subjects, the complex world as indicated by The Great Gaslighting of the JavaScript Era. The lead image for this article was generated by HackerNoon's via the prompt "early internet browser". AI Image Generator

The History of Web Developers Tied to Browser Development

ওয়েব ডেভেলপারদের ইতিহাস ব্রাউজার ডেভেলপমেন্টের সাথে যুক্ত

Die Geschichte der Webentwickler im Zusammenhang mit der Browserentwicklung

La historia de los desarrolladores web vinculados al desarrollo de navegadores

L'histoire des développeurs Web liée au développement du navigateur

ब्राउज़र विकास से जुड़े वेब डेवलपर्स का इतिहास

ブラウザ開発に結びついた Web 開発者の歴史

브라우저 개발과 관련된 웹 개발자의 역사

A história dos desenvolvedores da Web vinculados ao desenvolvimento de navegadores

Tarayıcı Geliştirmeye Bağlı Web Geliştiricilerinin Tarihi

Lịch sử của các nhà phát triển web gắn với phát triển trình duyệt

Web 开发人员与浏览器开发相关的历史

This story takes place somewhere between 1997 and 2016. A decade before modern day web components, Microsoft had already hit on a formula for their success. In the mid to late 90’s, browser development fractured. Along one fault line was Netscape Navigator, an established player; the most popular browser by a wide margin. Netscape added new features at a rapid clip in order to make the web more dynamic, more visual, and more interactive. They were an important part of the web standards process, but they often belied it in favor of quick iteration and new browser releases. On the other side, Microsoft was playing catch-up. They sometimes implemented what Netscape already had. Other times, they included their own proprietary features—or web standards Netscape hadn’t gotten to yet—in an attempt to differentiate themselves. The web was in transition. Developers wanted complex applications and websites that animated and moved through the surfing experience. In the midst of all of that, HTML components were created. Years and years later, they would be cited as . But before the web got there, it followed a trail of technologies on the web that have since been almost entirely abandoned. “prior art” for modern day web components In the mid-90’s, Java was one of the most popular programming languages around. Sun Microsystems—the creator of Java—experienced a resurgence after its release, which they marketed heavily to large, enterprise IT departments. One of the promises of Java was that it let programmers, “write once, run anywhere” (much like the cross-platform promise of the early web). Java offered portability and performance in a package that for many developers felt intuitive and easy to use. It was rapidly adopted by large teams and individual developers as a way of creating complex software applications. Sun knew that if it could embed Java applications on the web, it would provide a huge opportunity for developers. They created a browser of their own specifically to showcase that kind of capability. Released in 1997, HotJava was the first browser to include what’s known as Java applets, embedded applications written in Java and served via the web. It was suddenly possible for an organization to write advanced software for their entire company—a shared calendar or some writing software—and ship it to everyone instantaneously using the web. At least, in theory. Applets provided the web with real value for two reasons. The first was the write once ethos. Big enterprise software solutions were being created with Java, and being able to ship those applications on the web was another prominent example of “run anywhere.” The second was the way it enabled discrete components to live inside of the web. By the mid-90’s, the dream of the web was shifting from something static and information based to something dynamic and application-driven. Many believed the web would one day replace the standard operating system (a fact that has, in some ways, come true, but not in the way that people imagined). Applets were another step towards that dream. Netscape Navigator 2, first released in the fall of 1998, included Java applets in their browser. It was one of the most widely talked topics of the day. Also included in Netscape 2 was a lesser known scripting language spun off conceptually (though ultimately completely separate and apart) from Java. It was called Mocha, and then LiveScript. Some developers were experimenting with it, but it lacked the buzz and reputation of Java, so Netscape renamed it to JavaScript to try to buy in to the hype. In order to make JavaScript work, Netscape created what they called a “language independent object model,” used by the browser to structure a webpage programmatically in a way that allowed it to be changed dynamically and on the fly using a script. The W3C—the official standards body for the web—took this and created a specification for Document Object Model, or DOM. It was Microsoft, however, and not Netscape that implemented the first version of the W3C DOM in Internet Explorer 4, released in 1997. Hoping to differentiate themselves in a browser market very much dominated by Netscape, Microsoft turned to HTML, CSS, and other web standards—as well as their own proprietary features such as the dynamic software framework ActiveX. This blend of standard markup, the introduction of CSS, and additional scripting languages used to manipulate the DOM eventually became known as Dynamic HTML, or DHML. DHTML was Microsoft’s answer to Java applets. Partially as a response to ongoing conflicts Microsoft was having with both Sun and Netscape, Microsoft leaned away from Java and towards HTML and other standardized web technologies like the still-new CSS. Which brought Microsoft all the way back around in 1998 with the release of Internet Explorer 5.5, which introduced HTML components. They extended the elements of the DOM in a way that made them accessible directly to developers. With HTML components, developers could bind new behaviors directly to existing elements in HTML using a combination of CSS, JavaScript, and a specialized version of (believe it or not) XML. They made possible rollovers, animations, transitions, modals, and advanced forms and applications. Even more interesting was the ability to create custom markup elements defined as HTML component behaviors. Using a new file format, developers could group metadata, JavaScript and HTML all in a single file and directly extend HTML to create an entirely something entirely new. Writing about the Trident rendering engine when it was sunset by Microsoft, : Der Schepp provides an example of this <public:component tagname="rollimg">
  <public:attach event="onmouseover" onevent="rollover()" />
  <public:attach event="onmouseout" onevent="rollout()" />
  <public:property name="src" />
</public:component>

<img id="image" />

<script>
  // IE's document.getElementByID
  var img = document.all['image'];
  img.src = element.src;
  img.id = undefined;
  element.appendChild(img);

  function rollover() {
    img.src = "rollover-" + element.src;
  }
  function rollout() {
    img.src = element.src;
  }
</script> And then to add it to a page: <custom:rollimg src="logo.png"> If you create application-driven websites today the above syntax might strike you as familiar. That’s because HTML components are not too dissimilar from modern day Web Components, which weren’t adopted by browsers until nearly a decade later. Web components are a series of Web APIs that actually allow developers to create unique HTML elements, with CSS and JavaScript bundled alongside. If you use modern day frameworks like React or Vue, then single file type components might be familiar. Custom elements in Web Components can be passed attributes just as in HTML components, the latter of which also included a “viewlink” which ensured behaviors applied to the attached element; not unlike the Shadow DOM of modern web components. only If the similarities feel uncanny, that’s somewhat by design. HTML Components, . Yet even with HTML components as a reference, and after years of development, it took some time for Web Components to be adopted and put to use. A reminder that even as technology evolves, and comes back around to old ideas, it can take a long time for a rolling stone to gather enough moss to become a widely adopted, widely used technology on the web. which were deprecated in IE10, served as an inspiration for Web Components This post introduced 5 milestones to the Timeline. Web Components July 10, 2011 Alex Russell—representing his work via Google with the W3C and TC39—introduces Web Components on a public stage for the first time. They make possible the creation of custom HTML elements through a combination of familiar web technologies, such as CSS and JavaScript, as well as novel browser features like the Shadow DOM and HTML templates. The specification and implementation would go through years of iteration before it was formally adopted by browsers. HTML Components July 23, 2001 Upon its release, Internet Explorer 5.5 includes support for HTML components, which allows developers to attach new behaviors to existing HTML elements, and even create new elements using a combination of JavaScript, HTML, and a specialized version of XML. Internet Explorer 5 March 18, 1999 The first Microsoft browser released to a market with a share greater than Netscape's, Internet Explorer 5 saw many improvements from previous versions. Its speed, usability, developer technologies such as ActiveX and XMLHTTPRequest support, and wide range of Internet features made it one of the most advanced browsers on the market. When the 5.5 version was released several years later, it would also include HTML components. HotJava March 24, 1997 Sun Microsystems releases their first and only browser to the market. Originally forked from Mosaic several years earlier, HotJava was rewritten in the Java programming language for its release. Its main differentiator was support for Java applets, a technology that made it possible to run full Java applications right inside of a webpage, later adopted by most major browsers. Netscape Navigator 2.0 September 18, 1995 Netscape releases the second version of their browser on the heels of a massively successful IPO. The browsers is faster, includes an email and messenger client, and provides an easy to use layer for new web users. It is also the first version of the browser to include support for Java applets and an offshoot scripting language created at Netscape known as JavaScript. View the Full Timeline Sources Michael Byrne. "The Rise and Fall of the Java Applet: Creative Coding’s Awkward Little Square." Vice. September 9, 2021. https://www.vice.com/en/article/8q8n3k/a-brief-history-of-the-java-applet Richard MacManus. "1997: The Year of DHTML." Web Development History. June 6, 2021. https://webdevelopmenthistory.com/1997-the-year-of-dhtml/ Yakov Fain. "The unofficial history of Java applets." August 8, 2010. https://yakovfain.com/2010/08/10/the-unofficial-history-of-java-applets/ Jason Cranford Teague. "CSS, DHTML, and Ajax, Fourth Edition." 2006. https://flylib.com/books/en/3.292.1.106/1/ First Published . Here

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NETSCAPE

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1K-5K employees

Since 1985

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